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Executive summary
Most foreign direct investment into Russia originates in the European Union: European 
investors own between 55 percent and 75 percent of Russian FDI stock. This points to a 
Russian dependence on European investment, making the EU paramount for Russian 
medium-term growth. Even if we consider ‘phantom’ FDI that transits through Europe, the 
EU remains the primary investor in Russia. Most phantom FDI into Russia is believed to 
originate from Russia itself and thus is by construction not foreign. 
Over the last decade, three main factors have determined FDI flows into Russia. First, the 
energy sector (oil and gas) plays a predominant role in the Russian economy and dominates 
exports. It has become a major focus of investment flows, including investment in associated 
activities dependent on energy extraction. The high concentration of FDI in regions rich in 
natural resources is evidence of the significance of the energy sector for foreign investment.
Second, the high degree of uncertainty induced by a volatile exchange rate has discour-
aged foreign investment, while the ruble has been heavily affected by the changing oil price. 
The gradual evolution in the policy of Russia’s central bank from exchange rate management 
to inflation targeting has helped macroeconomic stability in the medium term. 
Third, FDI into Russia is affected by the wider trade and investment context, which in 
turn are affected by institutional structures, or the lack thereof. Sanctions have been a major 
obstacle to investment in recent years.
The EU’s pledge to decarbonise places Russia in a difficult situation because oil and gas 
have long been at the heart of its economy, especially when it comes to external relations. 
Furthermore, the literature on the growth impacts of FDI highlights many of the benefits from 
technology transfers, which are often lacking when FDI is focused on fossil-fuel extraction. 
The Russian economy needs more investment in higher-value added activities, which the EU 
is in a position to provide.
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1 Introduction and state of play
The Russian economy has been through a turbulent decade during which it was deeply 
affected by the global financial crisis and the collapse of commodity prices (especially oil) 
between 2014 and 2016. During this period, foreign direct investment into Russia saw a 
medium to high degree of volatility, for several reasons. First, not only are oil and gas Russia’s 
core exports, Russia’s oil and gas industry is a major target for FDI. Russia’s reliance on oil has 
made direct investment highly vulnerable to changes in the oil price. Second, in part be-
cause of the pressure that lower oil prices place on Russia’s currency and wider economy, the 
macroeconomic environment has been highly unstable. Monetary policy has been used to 
mitigate these effects. Finally, the international political and economic relationships between 
Russia and other countries have influenced FDI flows. Trade remains closely interrelated with 
this category of investment, while western sanctions that targeted medium-term financing 
capabilities have also been an obstacle to investments. 
Recent economic developments in Russia have been discouraging. In the decade after 
the financial crisis (2008-2018), average annualised growth of Russian nominal GDP (in 
dollars) was slightly negative. The financial crisis resulted in an 8 percent drop in GDP, but 
the economy recovered relatively quickly supported by strong monetary and fiscal policies 
(Dabrowski and Collin, 2019). A second downturn in 2014-2015 was spurred by the collapse 
of the currency (under massive pressure from the oil price collapse and western sanctions). 
The ruble lost over half of its value against the dollar, though central bank efforts ultimately 
stabilised the currency and reduced inflation (which was at 2.5 percent in 2017 compared to 
12.9 percent in 2015) (Dabrowski, 2019). 
Russia also faces major structural challenges. Russia has an ageing population, expected 
to shrink by 7 percent by 2050, which must be supported by a shrinking labour force. Addi-
tionally, the business climate is problematic, corruption is high and the protection of property 
rights is poor (Russia was ranked 138th in Transparency International’s Corruption Percep-
tions Index1 and eighty-fourth in the International Property Rights Index2). That said, the 
World Bank’s Doing Business report ranked Russia an encouraging twenty-eighth in 2019. 
Many of these systemic obstacles in the Russian business environment relate to the shift in 
corporate ownership during the transition to a market-based economy. State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) were privatised through schemes that resulted in a heavy domestic concentration of 
wealth and rendered FDI negligible (Di Bella et al, 2019). The high degree of vertical integra-
tion of former SOEs provided few opportunities for foreign companies; most FDI focused on 
extracting resources and as such resulted in very limited growth spillovers to the wider economy. 
FDI remains concentrated in Moscow, St. Petersburg and oil-heavy regions. Finally, Russian 
economic dependence on European investment is high, despite political attempts to diversify. 
This coupled with the EU’s growing decarbonisation efforts and Russia’s international isolation, 
as well as other structural issues, result in bleak prospects for Russian investment and growth.
Russia has a pressing need to diversify its economy away from resource extraction. European 
investment could provide an engine for the growth of higher value-added sectors and the subse-
quent boost to the overall economy. The EU could offer diversification and growth opportunities 
by investing in Russian manufacturing and value chain operations. European efforts to decar-
bonise will present a substantial challenge for Russia, given that oil and gas are at the heart of the 
EU-Russia trade and investment relationship. Increased Russian interest in euro-denominated 
contracts could also help increase the relevance of the euro in international commodities mar-
kets. Furthermore, given poor domestic protection of property rights, Russian elites frequently 
rely on EU capital markets, increasing the political significance of this economic relationship. 
Indeed, as the estimates in section 2 show, a main source of phantom FDI is Russia itself. 
1 See https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018.
2 See http://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org.
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2 Where does FDI into Russia come from?
In the last decade, FDI into Russia has seen a medium-high degree of volatility, in line with a 
tumultuous macroeconomic environment. 
Figure 1 shows FDI stocks in Russia divided by the major international players. During the 
period examined (2009-2017), European investors owned between 55 percent and 75 percent 
of the Russian FDI stock (and regularly made up a large percentage of flows, as evident from 
Figure 1). Thus, Russian economic dependence on European investment is high. Notwith-
standing recent efforts to diversify, Chinese investment remains orders of magnitude smaller. 
Figure 2 further breaks down stocks of EU FDI into EU countries or groups of countries. 
It is important to note that in recent years, global FDI flows have been characterised by the 
prevalence of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and other conduits that are employed to mini-
mise tax exposure and hide the ultimate origin of capital. This has resulted in relatively small 
countries registering FDI inflows and outflows that are many times greater than expected for 
such countries. A large percentage of these flows barely register an effect in the economies 
that host the SPEs – the flows merely transit through those economies. In order to illustrate 
this, the second panels of Figures 1 and 2 show FDI stocks in Russia by ultimate investing 
country (UIC), as estimated by Damgaard et al (2019). When looked at this way, flows from 
the EU are likely overstated. However, the EU remains by far the premier provider of FDI to 
Russia.
Figure 1: FDI stocks in Russia, € billions, as reported (left panel) and estimates 
taking into account ultimate investing countries (right panel)
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission Finflows (Joint JRC-DG ECFIN database) and Damgaard et al (2019). Notes: Offshore is 
the aggregate of UK Caribbean, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Panama and the Seychelles.
The EU’s significance as the main investor in Russia becomes clearer when one considers 
that the origin of the second-largest stock of FDI appears to be the Russian Federation itself. 
This investment is by construction not genuinely foreign; when it is subtracted from the total, 
the EU returns to being the consistent owner of over 50 percent of the Russian FDI stock. 
Casella (2019) has also estimated the ultimate origin of flows using a different methodology 
to Damgaard et al (2019)3. The estimates by Casella (2019) indicate that United States values 
are understated: almost 8.9 percent of the stock of inward FDI into Russia in 2017 is thought to 
have originated in the US, in contrast with the 3.2 percent seen in reported data. However, this 
3 Casella (2019) nonetheless classified the origin of 28.2 percent of the inward FDI stock in Russia as ‘Confidential/
Unspecified’. Casella’s paper was done for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
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remains small compared to that of the EU (which is the origin of close to five times more FDI 
stock in Russia).
Finally, the values for investment from offshore sources are similar in reported data and 
UIC estimates. For example, even for FDI originating from the EU, estimated UIC values still 
show that a substantial part of FDI stocks originate from financial centres. This would indicate 
that the estimation method employed by Damgaard et al (2019) fails to identify UIC in some 
cases, especially when it relates to more opaque jurisdictions. It is plausible (indeed likely) 
that some of the investment in Russia from these financial centres originates from other coun-
tries, including Russia itself.
Figure 2: FDI stock as reported (left panel) and UIC estimates (right panel), EU 
breakdown, € billions
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission Finflows (Joint JRC-DG ECFIN database) and Damgaard et al (2019). Notes: EU countries 
have been grouped as follows: Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), CEE (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia), euro-area creditors (Austria, Belgium and Finland), euro-area debtors (Portugal and Greece) and financial centres 
(Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta).
With this in mind, perhaps the first insight provided by the geographical breakdown of 
flows from the EU is the similarity in patterns between member states. While these member 
states operate within the same regulatory framework (and often the same currency), bilateral 
relationships with Russia vary significantly and are affected by long-standing historical ties. 
Despite this (and leaving aside the differences between EU countries in terms of size) the 
trajectory followed by FDI inflows into Russia shows ample similarities between the groups 
of EU countries (this is even more evident in data on flows compared to stocks); the peaks 
and troughs are largely replicated for all the groups. This would indicate that flows are largely 
driven by the volatility of the Russian environment and global geopolitics, as opposed to indi-
vidual relationships with specific member states or developments in the countries of origin. 
Points to note include the small presence of Germany, which is even smaller according to UIC 
estimates. Germany’s stock of FDI in Russia fell gradually throughout the examined period. 
Meanwhile, the French FDI stock in Russia remains small, even though flows increased 
recently. For UK FDI in Russia, stock values are low but flows are volatile and prominent. This 
is because the absolute value of gross flows is large but periodically switches from positive to 
negative. This indicates that these investments remain speculative and short-term. This might 
be driven, in part, by Russian investors directing funds abroad through British entities.
Several EU countries clearly stand out for their outsized roles, especially in officially 
reported figures. First, the significance of the Netherlands is evident. While the Netherlands 
has large net outflows of ‘genuine’ FDI, the country hosts a large number of SPEs which likely 
inflate official reported values. UIC estimates show total FDI stock from the Netherlands to 
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be much smaller, at about €10.3 billion in 2017 (in stark contrast to the €105 billion found in 
reported figures). The ‘financial centres’ group of countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg 
and Malta) also plays a disproportionate role – the members of this group were chosen pre-
cisely because of their large balance sheets relative to GDP. Cypriot subsidiaries in particular 
hold large amounts of assets for Russian entities, which are occasionally repatriated as FDI. 
However, these numbers remain within the same ballpark both for reported figures and UIC 
estimates. It is plausible to assume that these flows are not originally from Cyprus, but hide 
capital from other countries, including from Russia itself.
3 Drivers of FDI flows 
Three main drivers have determined the evolution of FDI flows into Russia in the past decade: 
the energy sector, macroeconomics and monetary policy, and the international context (from 
trade to institutional obstacles).
3.1 The energy sector
The energy sector, most notably oil and gas, plays a predominant role in the Russian econo-
my (as the source of over half of Russia’s exports and the vast majority of its foreign currency 
reserves) and is the destination for a significant percentage of FDI inflows. The two main ep-
isodes of declining FDI (2009 and 2014) happened at times of collapse in the oil price, which 
on both occasions lost over half of its value within the span of a few months. Furthermore, in 
2011 (which represents another period of declining FDI), the price of oil declined by almost a 
third, though it recovered fairly quickly. 
Figure 3: Brent crude oil price ($)
Source: Bloomberg. Notes: Values after October 2019 reflect the futures market. The Brent benchmark is employed as a proxy for the oil 
market.
The fall in the oil price during these episodes (especially in 2009 and 2014) was driven by 
declining global demand. Since 2014, this decline appears to be structural (the oil futures 
market would indicate there is little expectation of a recovery, as shown by Figure 3). This, 
combined with an ambitious pledge to turn towards green energy in the EU (the premier 
consumer market for Russian oil and gas), makes for a discouraging medium-term outlook for 
FDI into Russia. Even though FDI flows recovered somewhat in 2016 despite the new, lower, 
equilibrium oil price this recovery appears to have since partially reversed.
Sectoral and regional distributions of FDI provide a greater insight into the role played 
by the energy sector. Figure 4 shows data from the Bank of Russia on FDI inflows for the four 
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major sectors: wholesale and retail trade; mining and quarrying (which according to the 
guidelines consists almost exclusively of fossil fuels); manufacturing; and financial and insur-
ance. In total, the Bank of Russia provides data for 22 sectors, but the remaining sectors play 
a fairly negligible role (in Figure 4 they are grouped as other). It should be noted that Russian 
GDP fluctuates quite substantially, contributing to some of the volatility seen in the graph.
Figure 4: Gross FDI flows per sector, % of GDP
Source: Bruegel based on Bank of Russia, IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2019). Notes: Quarterly FDI figures are divided by quarterly FDI.
Further central bank data on the regional distribution of FDI complements the picture. 
Excluding the wider Moscow area and, to a lesser extent, St. Petersburg, the oil and gas-heavy 
Tyumen region (not including its autonomous provinces) and the autonomous province of 
Yamalo-Nenets (Gazprom’s main hub) received 45 percent of all remaining FDI in the first 
quarter of 2019. The rest was shared between the remaining 86 regions. The aforementioned 
oil-rich regions are fairly small, with little other economic activity outside the energy sector. 
Sakhalin Island and Krasnoyarsk Krai, where oil is also an important part of the local econ-
omy, also rank highly. This indicates that sectoral data could underestimate the importance 
of the energy sector for some regions. Some of the non-mining and quarrying investment 
appears to be going into businesses directly related to oil and gas extraction, but this is very 
hard to disentangle. 
The concentration of FDI in natural resource sectors can negatively affect the GDP of 
the ultimate host country. Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2013) showed that FDI in natural 
resources crowds-out FDI in other productive industries, and can result in lower overall FDI. 
The impact is particularly evident when natural resources are first discovered. Hayat (2018) 
found that natural resources reduce the growth effect of FDI to the point that it can become 
negative. At the same time, there is a low level of spillover effect associated with natural-re-
source extraction, given that it is typically an activity that requires few local inputs. Thus the 
growth potential is low, in contrast with FDI in manufacturing and technology. 
The values presented above underestimate the extent of FDI that enters and exits 
Russia regularly. Ultimately, gross inflows (shown in Figure 4) represent the net acquisition 
of Russian assets by foreigners and as such can be negative (net flows would be the net 
acquisition of assets minus the net acquisition of liabilities)4. Given that FDI represents 
medium to long-term investment, this typically provides an accurate depiction of overall FDI 
activity. However, in the case of Russia, there is a fair amount of short-term FDI that partially 
stems from the fact that a non-negligible percentage of reported FDI in Russia ultimately 
originates in Russia itself, and has been re-routed through foreign entities. Figure 5 shows 
the gross acquisition of assets in Russia by foreign investors and gross sale of assets in Russia 
4  See Claeys et al (forthcoming) for a more detailed explanation.
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by foreign investors (which net out to the values in Figure 4). The size of these values is very 
large. The extent of financial-sector activity (both in gross acquisitions and gross sales) in 2010 
and 2011 stands out in particular.
Figure 5: Gross foreign acquisition (top panel) and sale (lower panel) of Russian 
assets per sector, % of GDP
Source: Bruegel based on Bank of Russia, IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2019). Notes: Quarterly FDI figures are divided by quarterly FDI.
Finally, the ‘Dutch disease’ effect of natural resource exploitation has played a key role 
in the Russian economy. This term describes the phenomenon that arises when a natural 
resource windfall results in a rapid appreciation of the currency, worsening terms of trade for 
other exports and reducing the competitiveness of other industries. This hurts the wider econ-
omy. This phenomenon took place in Russia during the early 2000s, when increases in the 
price of oil resulted in a gradual appreciation of the ruble, reducing investment in non-fossil 
fuel sectors (which became increasingly uncompetitive in international markets). 
Furthermore, beyond the immediate damage, the effects of this period persisted after 
the currency appreciation was reversed. The IMF (2017) reported that the bursting of the 
resource bubble did not lead to an easing of the effects of Dutch disease in Russia. Even 
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though oil prices and the ruble collapsed periodically during the last decade, a crowding out 
of manufacturing industries had already taken place when this downward trend started. This 
crowding out was enhanced by an incomplete economic transition in the 1990s and 2000s 
when state aid was ubiquitous. Economic activity had already become concentrated in the 
resource sector, a shift that could not be reversed easily when the terms of trade improved5. 
The damage caused to other industries by years of focus on resource extraction meant many 
other industries could not be salvaged. 
3.2 Macroeconomics and monetary policy
The volatile macroeconomic environment in Russia and Russia’s monetary policy have signifi-
cantly affected FDI flows. FDI flows are traditionally considered less volatile than other capital 
flows (they represent a more substantial level of involvement in a particular entity that will be 
harder to exit and, as such, are less prone to speculation). That said, FDI into the oil sector is 
typically more speculative given volatility in oil markets. More generally, the high degree of 
uncertainty resulting from the volatile exchange rate has discouraged foreign investment. The 
ruble has been heavily affected by the price of oil in recent decades: oil exports provide the 
largest source of dollar reserves for a country that until 2015 regularly intervened in foreign 
exchange markets to manage the exchange rate. A change from exchange rate management to 
inflation targeting was formalised in 2014.
Figure 6: Euro-ruble exchange rate
Source: Bloomberg.
The Bank of Russia has actively participated in foreign currency markets in the past two 
decades. Since 2000, the ruble exchange rate has evolved from being very tightly controlled 
(2000-2005), to being free-floating in an inflation-targeting regime (Korhonen and Nuuti-
lainene, 2017). But the central bank still reserves the right to intervene in foreign exchange 
markets and prevent undue volatility. The bank has been able to mitigate the worst effects of 
exchange rate fluctuations, often driven by movements in the oil price. 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, the Bank of Russia identified downward pressure on 
the ruble caused by capital flight and the erosion of the current account balance. The bank 
allowed the gradual depreciation of the ruble, progressively widening the currency band, 
yet simultaneously supported it through market operations that depleted a third of central 
bank reserves in three months (Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 2013). It should be 
noted that Figure 8 (which shows reserve assets) does not fully reflect this depletion. Figure 
8 shows yearly data, yet the fall recorded between 2008 and 2009 was preceded and followed 
by episodes of reserve asset growth, mitigating the yearly fall. In 2014, intervention played an 
even greater role as the announcement of exchange rate flexibility increased pressure on the 
5 For a discussion of the mechanisms, see Krugman (1987).
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currency, which had been already weakened by the oil collapse and sanctions. The central 
bank supported the currency with reserves (Figure 8) and made great use of the policy rate 
(Figure 7). Their efforts during the ruble collapses of 2009 and 2014 are evident in the data. 
Figure 7: One-week repo rate, percentage points
Source: Trading Economics I Central Bank of Russia.
Greater flexibility together with the announcement in 2014 of the pursuit of a fully floating 
exchange rate and an inflation-targeting system had the opposite effect to the previous poli-
cies. The 2014 announcements came at a time when pressure on the currency was mounting 
and likely added additional pressure, contributing to the heavy depreciation of the ruble. The 
implication that the central bank would allow the currency to float freely naturally weakened 
the ruble’s credibility and caused a (mild) episode of capital flight. In the ensuing months the 
central bank went to great lengths to support the currency and assuage market fears, partially 
subverting monetary policy to this end. While officially the exchange rate target was given up 
in November 2014, the central bank intervened heavily to prevent the collapse of the currency 
up to the end of 2014 and in the first weeks of 2015. While the decline in reserves is evidence 
of central bank efforts (reserves fell by close to 30 percent between 2013 and 2015), this 
episode was characterised by the rapid rise of the policy rate (to 1700 basis points). Korhonen 
and Nuutilainene (2017) explored whether a significant change in the effects of monetary 
policy can be identified as a consequence of the evolution in regime. They identified early 
2015 as an important turning point, marked by a break in the estimated Taylor rule.
Figure 8: Reserve assets, $ billions
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. Notes: Reserve assets according to BMP6 (monetary gold, SDR holdings, reserve position in 
the IMF, currency and deposits, securities, financial derivatives, and other claims).
Overall, the effects of the currency’s collapse (including effects on FDI) were undoubtedly 
mitigated by the rapid and thorough actions of the central bank. Furthermore, the fact that 
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the Russian currency fared fairly well throughout 2018 and was not heavily affected by turmoil 
and capital flight in other emerging economies is a testament to the credibility of this infla-
tion-targeting system (especially as these times of turmoil coincided with rounds of sanctions 
against Russia). 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the oil sector in Russia remains fairly dollarised. Many 
contracts (both commercial and investment) are concluded in foreign jurisdictions and 
denominated in foreign currency; as such they are not devalued by fluctuations in the ruble. 
Similarly, energy companies hold fairly large shares of dollar debt (against largely dollar rev-
enues). Therefore, FDI in the energy sector can remain relatively detached from movements 
in the currency. However, the insecurity that foreign exchange volatility poses to value chain 
management in multinational enterprises does cause uncertainty, while the associated polit-
ical tensions deter foreign investors. Moreover, energy companies still depend on domestic 
revenues and costs. Therefore, an excessive degree of dollarisation (and especially a very large 
share of dollar debt) can make companies vulnerable to large fluctuations in the ruble by 
making it harder for them to service their dollar commitments and thus raising their probabil-
ity of default. That said, there has recently been an evolution among Russian oil giants, which 
are establishing euro-denominated contracts. Rosneft, a state-controlled oil company that is 
one of the world’s largest, announced in summer 2019 that all contracts would henceforth be 
in euro6.
3.3 International context
Finally, FDI is affected by the wider trade and investment context, which is itself affected 
by institutional structures, or the lack thereof, that facilitate cross-border operations. This 
sub-section explores the relationship between FDI and other economic ties, chiefly trade, and 
how FDI has been affected by the institutional obstacles to a deeper relationship. 
FDI and trade generally are deeply interrelated, as FDI provides foreign players with a 
domestic infrastructure that facilitates operations and can serve as a substitute for trade 
when regulation allows. FDI can signal an investment in the medium-term commercial 
relationship. Lukewarm FDI numbers between the EU and Russia could relate to the decline 
in trade in goods between them in the past decade, with gross imports and gross exports both 
decreasing by almost a quarter between 2008 and 2018. Furthermore, in 2018 oils and mineral 
fuels7 made up over three quarters of Russian exports to the EU. This is in line with FDI pat-
terns and is another sign of the existence of few other areas of competitive economic activity.
The economic literature finds that the growth effects of FDI mostly arise from knowledge 
transfers and spillovers8. A concentration of both trade and FDI in the energy sector indi-
cates this is the clear focus for foreign players. This trade and investment is concerned almost 
exclusively with extraction and associated activities. This form of FDI rarely provides spillo-
vers and has a limited effect on growth. In contrast, investments by multinational enterprises 
in manufacturing could help integrate the Russian economy into global value chains and 
could result in the diffusion of knowledge and technology transfers, with considerable growth 
benefits. Furthermore, FDI into non-energy sector industries is likely to be less volatile, 
not as heavily determined by the performance of the oil markets (as such, it should make a 
positive contribution to macroeconomic stability). It would further diversify exports from oil 
into higher value-added (and differentiated) sectors. Deepening trade relationships in these 
sectors would then provide an opportunity to attract other forms of FDI. However, Russia has 
very high barriers to trade, mainly of non-tariff character, which means it offers little incentive 
6 Natalia Chumakova and Olga Yagova, ‘Russia’s Rosneft to switch to euros in oil products tenders - traders’, Reuters, 
21 August 2019, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-rosneft-tenders-euro/russias-rosneft-to-
switch-to-euros-in-oil-products-tenders-traders-idUSL5N25H1ZT
7 Full name ‘Mineral fuels, oils and products of their distillation’, one of 97 categories in the first level of disaggrega-
tion of trade, World Integrated Trade Solution database.
8 See Hayat (2018) for a discussion of the growth effect of FDI in natural resources. 
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for wider investment.  
Furthermore, the Russian environment is characterised by a lack of institutional infra-
structure and recent international hostility towards Russia, complicating the development of 
closer ties. First, the Russian Federation only entered the World Trade Organisation in 2012 
and has concluded trade agreements with only 10 countries (mostly former Soviet states). 
In 2017, these free trade agreements covered only 11 percent of Russian exports, while EU28 
trade accounted for more than half. The comparative advantages of the other members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States are very similar to Russia’s (chiefly natural resources), 
reducing the economic value of mutual trade9. More importantly, there is virtually no 
opportunity for knowledge transfer through FDI. Furthermore, according to the World Bank’s 
2018 Doing Business report, Russia has the highest cost of border compliance in its region 
(6.7 times the EU average for exports and 17 times the EU average for imports)10. These trade 
impediments, together with poor protection of property rights, exchange rate volatility and 
the very high level of corruption, make Russia an unattractive market for global manufactur-
ing investment, despite its generally high level of education, post-Soviet industrial base and 
relatively large internal market. 
Second, recent years have been characterised by political hostility between Russia and 
western countries, resulting in damaging economic sanctions (and the looming threat of 
more). These have reduced the attractiveness of the Russian market for foreign investors at a 
time of opportunities for diversification. The practical difficulties of investing have been grow-
ing (medium and long-term financing has been targeted by sanctions), while the increase 
in barriers to trade make Russia a less attractive manufacturing hub and damage the growth 
potential of the Russian economy. Sanctions and the related tensions have had a negative 
effect on FDI, especially outside the energy sector, reducing overall FDI and making the 
energy sector relatively even more important. 
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of western sanctions introduced following the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 from the other factors. Nonetheless, the International Monetary 
Fund found their immediate effect to be a 1 percent to 1.5 percent drag on GDP, with a pos-
sible cumulative drag of 9 percent in the long term (IMF, 2015) (others estimates are around 
6 percent). World Bank estimates indicate the removal of sanctions would have resulted in 
0.9 percentage points higher growth in 2017 (World Bank, 2016). The impact on the finan-
cial system was undoubtedly larger: the closure of international capital markets at a time of 
currency crisis for Russian banks aggravated the financial situation, resulting in large bailouts 
from the central bank and the National Wealth Fund.
New rounds of US sanctions in 2018 had a limited effect but were targeted at Russian 
elites. Sanction episodes were followed by ruble depreciation that was minor, especially when 
one considers that it coincided with a time of generalised capital outflow from emerging 
markets. Finally, the possibility of future sanctions deters investors, given the potential legal 
uncertainty.
9 In 2017, minerals accounted for 25 percent of exports from Belarus, 61 percent exports from Kazakhstan (Russia’s 
two biggest trading partners among the Commonwealth of Independent States, recipients of roughly 80 percent 
of Russian exports under FTAs), compared to 58 percent of Russian exports. Source: The Economic Complexity 
Observatory. 
10 Drobyshevsky et al (2018) estimated that trade isolation is reducing Russian GDP growth rates by 1.1 percentage 
points per year. 
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4 Outlook and policy challenges for the EU-
Russia relationship
Russia has a window of opportunity to modernise its economy and progress up the value 
chain, or it will face significant economic headwinds given its fossil-fuel based ageing econ-
omy. Demographic change poses a major challenge to growth, while the dependency ratio is 
only contained by low life expectancy among men. Current economic activity relies heavily 
on European investment and the European market, yet natural resources remain at the core 
of the relationship. Given European efforts to go green, this source of activity could be highly 
threatened in the medium term. McGlade and Ekins (2015) estimated that up to 59 percent 
of gas reserves and 19 percent of oil reserves of former Soviet Union countries would be 
‘stranded’ if policies to meet the Paris Agreement’s two degrees Celsius goal are implemented. 
Rodrik (2016), meanwhile, argued that given the advancement of automation, manufacturing 
might soon cease to be a feasible basis for development. Furthermore, the opportunity to 
hedge European fossil fuel demand with Chinese demand remains limited (Zachmann, 2019). 
That said, Russia is well located to be a host of manufacturing outsourced from European 
economies. The EU can offer FDI in high value-added activities, while China remains a com-
petitor at the lower and mid-levels of the value chain and the US is a net exporter of oil (with 
even greater foreign policy tensions with Russia)11. However, foreign investment remains 
deterred by macroeconomic volatility, poor institutions and international isolation (in part 
because of sanctions).
Europe’s strong advantage in high value-added sectors raises the value of European FDI. 
In the right investment climate, Russia could benefit greatly from this, potentially creating a 
basis for economic cooperation and more sustainable growth. Greater diversification of the 
Russian economy would allow for the spread of knowledge and technology spillovers through 
manufacturing, and would also increase the stability of the macroeconomic environment 
and reduce pressure on the ruble from oil price fluctuations. Diversification would gradu-
ally wean Russia off a sector with very poor medium-term prospects. Russia’s relevance in 
commodities markets could also make the euro more relevant in commodities, deepening 
the liquidity of euro-denominated products (one of the European Commission’s proposed 
steps to strengthen the international role of the euro12). Russian oil contracts are increasingly 
euro-denominated.
Overall, EU capital markets are paramount both for the Russian economy generally and 
for Russian elites in particular. In the right climate, the EU could provide the basis for a medi-
um-term shift in Russia into high value-added industries with greater growth prospects, a 
shift that will be necessary when Europe goes green. 
11 For a discussion of the potential of China-Russia trade and investment see García-Herrero and Xu (2019) and 
Zachmann (2019).
12 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/strengthening-international-role-euro-swd-2019_en.pdf.
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